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1. INTRODUCTION: WHAT IS THE PROBLEM?
Oxford Dictionaries' 2016 word of the year, "post-truth," is de-
fined as "relating to or denoting circumstances in which objective
facts are less influential in shaping public opinion than appeals to
emotion and personal belief." Worries about a post-truth politics
are not new, however. Over a decade earlier, political satirist Ste-
phen Colbert introduced the concept of "truthiness," which accord-
ing to Colbert means "sort of what you want to be true, as opposed
to what the facts support . .. a truth larger than the facts that would
comprise it-if you cared about facts, which you don't[.]" 2 Philoso-
phers, and then general readers, became familiar with Harry
Frankfurt's strikingly similar definition of bullshit. 3 Frankfurt dis-
tinguished lies, which require the speaker's awareness of and intent
to deviate from the truth, from bullshit, which is "unconnected to a
concern with the truth."4 A bullshitter "offers a description of a cer-
tain state of affairs without genuinely submitting to the constraints
which the endeavor to provide an accurate representation of reality
imposes."5 The original target of Frankfurt's little essay was prob-
ably fashionable academic postmodernism-"various forms of skep-
* Professor of Law, Cornell Law School.
1. Amy B. Wang, "Post-Truth" Named 2016 Word of the Year by Oxford Dictionaries,
WASH. POST (Nov. 16, 2016).
2. Jacques Steinberg, 2005: In a Word; Truthiness, N.Y. TIMES (Dec. 25, 2005).
3. HARRY G. FRANKFURT, On Bullshit, in THE IMPORTANCE OF WHAT WE CARE ABOUT
117 (1998). The paper was reprinted as a stand-alone book in 2005. Citations are to the book
version.
4. HARRY G. FRANKFURT, ON BULLSHIT 30 (2005).
5. Id. at 32.
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ticism which deny that we can have any reliable access to an objec-
tive reality"6-but it was quickly pressed into service by critics of
partisan media and the seeming indifference to truth of certain po-
litical candidates.7
Which brings us to Donald Trump and his administration. One
of the unforgettable events from the early days of his presidency
was then Press Secretary Sean Spicer vehemently claiming that the
crowd at Trump's inauguration was "the largest audience to ever
witness an inauguration - period - both in person and around the
globe," 8 and contending that the National Park Service Photo,
showing the obviously much smaller Trump crowd, had been doc-
tored somehow. 9 The combative press conference might have been
long since forgotten if White House Senior Advisor Kellyanne Con-
way had not then appeared on Meet the Press and told an incredu-
lous Chuck Todd that Spicer had simply presented "alternative
facts."10 The attitude of the administration should not have come
entirely as a surprise. As a candidate, Trump told lies ranging from
the bizarre (his embrace of the conspiracy theory that there was a
relationship between the father of Senator Ted Cruz and Lee Har-
vey Oswald"), to the horrifying (he stated that he saw "with his own
eyes" thousands of Muslims cheering in New Jersey when the Twin
6. Id. at 64.
7. See, e.g., Matthew Yglesias, The Bullshitter-in-Chief, VOX (May 30, 2017); Quinta
Jurecic, On Bullshit and the Oath of Office: The "LOL Nothing Matters "Presidency, LAWFARE
(Nov. 23, 2016).
8. Glen Kessler, Spicer Earns Four Pinocchios for False Claims on Inauguration Crowd
Size, WASH. POST (Jan 22. 2017).
9. See Julie Hirschfeld Davis & Matthew Rosenberg, With False Claims, Trump Attacks
Media on Turnout and Intelligence Rift, N.Y. TIMES (Jan. 21, 2017). Spicer later resigned as
Press Secretary in protest of the appointment of Anthony Scaramucci as White House Com-
munications Director. Glenn Thrush & Maggie Haberman, Sean Spicer Resigns as White
House Press Secretary, N.Y. TIMES (July 21, 2017). Not long afterward, Scaramucci was fired
after giving a bizarre interview to a reporter for New Yorker magazine. See Ryan Lizza,
Anthony Scaramucci Called Me to Unload About White House Leakers, Reince Priebus, and
Steve Bannon, NEW YORKER (July 27, 2017). Spicer's post-White House history would be less
significant if he did not appear to be so concerned with restoring his reputation. See, e.g.,
Libby Casey, Who Spun It Best: Former Trump Staffers Fight to Cement Their Post-White
House Reputations, WASH. POST (Sept. 19, 2017). For all the talk of a post-truth White
House, it seems that there may be informal social penalties for brazen lying. For one thing,
Spicer is apparently having difficulty securing an on-air role as a television commentator due
to his lack of credibility. See Rebecca Savransky, TVNetworks Won't Hire Spicer Due to 'Lack
of Credibility': Report, HILL (Sept. 20, 2017, 8:28 AM EDT).
10. See Rebecca Sinderbrand, How Kellyanne Conway Ushered in the Era of Alternative
Facts', WASH. POST (Jan. 22, 2017). To his credit, Todd responded that "[a]lternative facts
are not facts. They are falsehoods." Id.
11. See Dan Spinelli, Trump Revives Rumor Linking Cruz's Father to JFKAssassination,
POLITICO (July 22, 2016, 11:25 AM EDT).
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Towers collapsed 2), to the utterly trivial (he said there are no chess
grandmasters in the United StateS 13). Remarkably, the New York
Times keeps a frequently updated online list of the lies Trump has
told since taking office. 14 These, too, range in seriousness from rel-
atively innocuous political puffing, such as taking credit for positive
outcomes that would have happened anyway (e.g., defense contrac-
tor Lockheed Martin's agreement to cut the cost of its F-35 fighter
program1 5 ), to pointless and easily disproven lies (such as claiming
to have received phone calls from the head of the Boy Scouts and
the President of Mexico, which never happened, 16 or stating that he
witnessed damage from Hurricane Harvey firsthand, which was
contradicted by reporters traveling with the President1 7 ), to causing
a severe rupture in the relationship with one of our closest allies
(Trump's repeated and unsubstantiated claim that British intelli-
gence officers eavesdropped on his communications during the cam-
paign18 ), to alleging that, unlike his predecessors, he made calls to
the families of American service personnel killed in action. 19 Trump
is also notoriously quick to label as "fake news" any press coverage
that makes him look bad, such as criticism of his administration's
12. See Glenn Kessler, Trump's Outrageous Claim That "Thousands" of New Jersey Mus-
lims Celebrated the 9/11 Attacks, WASH. POST (Nov. 22, 2015).
13. See Louis Jacobson, Trump Wrongly Maligns U.S. Chess Prowess, POLITIFACT (Oct.
14, 2016).
14. David Leonhart & Stuart A. Thompson, Trump's Lies, N.Y. TIMES, https://www.ny-
times.com/interactive/2017/06/23/opinion/trumps-lies.html (last updated Dec. 14, 2017).
15. See Michelle Ye Hee Lee, Trump's Claim Taking Credit for Cutting $600 Million from
the F-35 Program, WASH. POST (Jan. 31, 2017).
16. See Julie Hirschfeld Davis, Those Calls to Trump? White House Admits They Didn't
Happen, N.Y. TIMES (Aug. 2, 2017). For another example, consider Trump's claim, in a tweet,
that "[t]he Fake News Media will not talk about the importance of the United Nations Secu-
rity Council's 15-0 vote in favor of sanctions on N. Korea!" Conservative writer and Trump
critic Conor Friedersdorf lined up several articles from the Washington Post, New York
Times, and Los Angeles Times, all treating the Security Council vote as a major story. See
Conor Friedersdorf, Why Do Trump's Supporters Allow Him to Insult Their Intelligence?,
ATLANTIC (Aug. 7, 2017). As Friedersdorf noted, it would not be difficult for Trump to find
examples somewhere of unfair or biased press coverage, so why invent an easily disproven
grievance out of whole cloth?
17. See Aaron Blake, Trump Claimed He Witnessed Harvey's Devastation "First Hand."
The White House Basically Admits He Didn't, WASH. POST (Aug. 31, 2017).
18. See Peter Baker & Steven Erlanger, Trump Offers No Apology for Claim on British
Spying, N.Y. TIMES (Mar. 17, 2017).
19. See Glenn Kessler, Trump's Claim That Obama 'Didn't Make Calls'to Families of the
Fallen, WASH. POST (Oct. 16, 2017). Trump later was accused of insensitivity in his call to
the family of one service member; he denied making the comment that the deceased soldier
"knew what he signed up for," but the soldier's mother confirmed that he had made that
statement. See Philip Bump, Yet Again, Trump's Defensiveness Makes His Handling of a
Gold Star Family's Grief Worse, WASH. POST (Oct. 18, 2017).
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delayed response to the devastation in Puerto Rico caused by Hur-
ricane Maria. 20
Other presidents have lied, of course, but generally in order to
conceal serious misconduct or the effects of misbegotten policies.21
Trump is different in that he lies routinely, both for understandable
reasons and for no reason at all. As liberal political commentator
Kevin Drum wrote, in the good old days
[p]residents lied infrequently, but when they did, they told real
whoppers. And those whoppers were designed to cover up seri-
ous misdeeds. This is what makes Donald Trump so different.
He tells lies constantly, but his lies are mostly trivial. It's easy
to understand why Nixon or Clinton lied, regardless of whether
we approve. But it's not so easy to understand the point of
Trump's torrent of fibs. 2 2
The senselessness, and shamelessness, of Trump's lies contributes
to their disorienting effect, because they appear unconnected from
any strategic vision, whether well-intentioned or malevolent. This
is a novel form of Frankfurtian bullshit. The ordinary bullshitter,
according to Frankfurt, may not deceive us about the facts, but does
deceive us about the objective. "His only indispensably distinctive
characteristic is that in a certain way he misrepresents what he is
up to." 2 3 Voters knew why Bill Clinton lied about having had sex
with Monica Lewinsky, even while they disagreed over whether it
mattered to the assessment of Clinton in his official capacity. But
it is unclear even what personal end of Trump's-let alone what
interest of his supporters, or the Republican party, or the country
as a whole-is furthered by his apparent indifference to the truth.
Politics, including political campaigns, advertising (now super-
charged with money from Super PACs, thanks to Citizens United24),
20. See, e.g., Jon Greenberg, Fact-Checking Donald Trump's Tweets About Puerto Rico,
POLITIFACT (Oct. 1, 2017).
21. See Sheryl Gay Stolberg, Many Politicians Lie. But Trump Has Elevated the Art of
Fabrication, N.Y. TIMES (Aug. 7, 2017) (discussing lies told by Eisenhower, LBJ, Nixon, and
Clinton, and the allegations that the Bush administration lied about intelligence on weapons
of mass destruction in Iraq).
22. Kevin Drum, Donald Trump's Lies Are Different, MOTHER JONES (Aug. 7, 2017,11:22
AM), http://www.motherjones.com/kevin-drum/2017/08/donald-trumps-lies-are-different/.
23. FRANKFURT, supra note 4, at 54.
24. Citizens United v. Fed. Election Comm'n, 558 U.S. 310, 365-66 (2010) (invalidating,
on First Amendment grounds, restrictions in federal campaign-finance law on independent
expenditures by corporations, unions, and other groups). Political-action committees that
operate independently of a candidate, and supposedly spend money only on issue advertising,
are known as Super PACs. See, e.g., Center for Responsive Politics, Super PACs,
OPENSECRETS, https://www.opensecrets.org/pacs/superpacs.php (last visited Mar. 22, 2018).
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partisan and the increasingly beleaguered mainstream journalism
outlets, and the legislative sausage-making process, has long been
associated with lies, exaggeration, hucksterism, and other forms of
untruthful behavior. One who complains about lying in politics
risks sounding like Captain Renault expressing shock at the gam-
bling in Rick's joint in Casablanca. But this should not mean
simply acquiescing in the inevitable forward march of a post-truth
culture. 25 A certain amount of flimflam in politics, like the venera-
ble tradition of bragging about good economic numbers over which
a president has little control, may be tolerable. But other lies and
evasions may be considerably more damaging to the long-term sta-
bility of a political community. Perpetrating the belief that critical
news coverage is "fake news" erodes the capacity of an independent
press to hold government officials to account. Seeking to advance
policy goals by making flatly untrue factual assertions-such as the
claim, never clearly refuted by Republican Congressional leaders,
that the Affordable Care Act included a provision for "death pan-
els"2 6-prevents rational deliberation about the merits of the oppos-
ing position.
Truthfulness in public life is accordingly an ethical ideal. Seek-
ing to learn the truth and communicate it accurately to other people
are virtues that are necessary to a common form of life character-
ized by trust, respect, and the protection of human dignity.27 This
does not mean that truth has a value that is merely instrumental;
the value of truth is not reducible to its virtues.28 But it does pro-
vide a way into debates about truth that avoids technical problems
in the philosophy of language and metaphysics. Practical disci-
plines like law, politics, and journalism have a practical concern
with truth, but this does not mean that practical considerations ex-
haust the value of truth. It is only to suggest that the concerns
which motivate this Symposium may be addressed from the stand-
point of political ethics. Truth and truthfulness are related to other
things we care about, such as justice, dignity, liberty, solidarity, and
protection against arbitrary power. The most dangerous forms of
25. Compare the observation that a certain amount of deception is to be expected, and
may even be acceptable, "in the rough-and-tumble of markets," but, nevertheless, it is possi-
ble to define a subset of deception as actionable fraud. See Samuel W. Buell, Good Faith and
Law Evasion, 58 UCLA L. REV. 611, 638 (2011).
26. See, e.g., Don Gonyea, From the Start, Obama Struggled With Fallout From a Kind
of Fahe News, NAT'LPUB. RADIO (Jan. 10, 2017) (recounting the history of the "death panels"
myth, beginning with Sarah Palin's statement that her parents or her baby with Down Syn-
drome should not "have to stand in front of Obama's 'death panel' so his bureaucrats can
decide, based on a subjective judgment of their 'level of productivity in society').
27. See generally BERNARD WILLIAMS, TRUTH & TRUTHFULNESS (2002).
28. See id. at 57-61, 90-92.
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lying, manipulation, and bullshit by government officials do not re-
late to matters that can be resolved by observation, at least not di-
rectly. Untruthful practices in political life are not offenses against
empirical reality but against political ideals such as equality, reci-
procity, and the moral agency (and, hence, the dignity) of citizens.
Section II begins by considering an issue of general significance
in ethical theory-whether people acting in a professional role are
subject to limited or differentiated moral demands. After clearing
the groundwork and arguing that public officials, candidates for of-
fice, journalists, and other actors sometimes tell genuinely danger-
ous, damaging lies, and that their professional role does not create
a wholesale exemption from the requirements of morality, Section
III then confronts directly the problem of truth and objectivity.
Drawing from the work of Bernard Williams, it argues that truth in
politics is not primarily an epistemic problem but an ethical one,
having to do with the way political communities handle disagree-
ment and error. In turn, the value of truthfulness must be ex-
pressed in a system of institutions, practices, and dispositions in
order to be effective. 29 These social practices are informed by the
moral ends of the political community, and so are related to values
like truthfulness, although sometimes indirectly. From something
of an armchair perspective, the legal profession and much of main-
stream journalism appear to be holding up fairly well under the as-
sault of bullshit from the Trump administration. Finally, Section
IV concludes with an illustration of the capacity of public institu-
tions to enforce norms of truthfulness, notwithstanding a concerted
effort by powerful actors to obfuscate the truth. The example of
Trump's travel ban and the litigation that ensued shows how the
constitutive features of adversarial litigation can sustain truthful
practices.
II. TRUTH-DIFFERENTIATED DOMAINS?
One of the central questions in professional ethics is whether the
evaluation of persons acting in a professional role-as executive
branch officials, legislators, lawyers, policy advisors, journalists,
public-relations flacks, and so on-must be guided by the principles
and values of everyday, ordinary-person morality, or whether their
conduct should be evaluated using special norms and principles. 30
29. Id. at 208.
30. ALAN H. GOLDMAN, THE MORAL FOUNDATIONS OF PROFESSIONAL ETHICS 1-3 (1980);
THOMAS NAGEL, Ruthlessness in Public Life, in MORTAL QUESTIONS 75, 78 (1979) ("Either
public morality will be derivable from individual morality or it will not.").
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The latter view, generally known as role-differentiated morality,
does not posit public and professional domains as a free-fire zone,
altogether ungoverned by moral principles. Rather, the idea is that
there is some "deeper moral teleology"31 of the profession that justi-
fies special principles, permissions, and obligations that may devi-
ate from those applicable to persons generally. As against the gen-
eral moral value of anything, such as truth, there often stands the
claim associated with Machiavelli and Weber that the responsibili-
ties of professionals or government officials are different enough
that distinctive duties and virtues-some of which may seem like
vices when looked at from the ordinary moral perspective-are nec-
essary for the realization of some end such as the security of the
country or the functioning of an adversarial system of justice.32 A
couple of well-known articles about business and legal ethics, re-
spectively, adopt an unsentimental, hard-headed perspective on the
distinctive norms applicable to professionals. They are not only
bona fide classics in their fields, but they nicely illustrate the sorts
of arguments and attitudes that might be used by politicians, advi-
sors, spokespersons, and others accused of playing fast and loose
with the truth.
Albert Carr's notorious 1968 article "Is Business Bluffing Ethi-
cal?"33 continues to serve as a foil for arguments that business man-
agers should respect the same ethical norms in business as they do
in their private lives, including the obligation of truthfulness. Carr
thinks this view is naive, an illusion that should be cast aside. 34
Business ethics is not continuous with private morality but should
be understood as a game with constitutive rules, and as long as one
does not transgress the rules of the game, she is not a wrongdoer.
Misrepresenting the value of one's hand in poker, bluffing, is simply
a strategy available to a player and something that makes the game
interesting. Marking cards is cheating, because it is not permitted
by the rules of the game, but bluffing is perfectly acceptable. The
implication for business is that the only constraint on a manager's
actions is the profit of the enterprise. If this means engaging in
"small or large deceptions" 35 where strategically useful, so be it. If
31. GOLDMAN, supra note 30, at 7.
32. See, e.g., WILLIAMS, TRUTH, supra note 27, at 207; BERNARD WILLIAMS, Politics and
Moral Character, in MORAL LUCK (1981); STUART HAMPSHIRE, INNOCENCE AND EXPERIENCE
(1989); MAX WEBER, Politics as Vocation, in FROM MAX WEBER: ESSAYS IN SOCIOLOGY 77,
121, 123 (Hans H. Gerth & C. Wright Mills eds., 1946); NICCOL() MACHIAVELLI, THE PRINCE
84 (Luigi Ricci trans., E.R.P. Vincent ed., 1935).
33. Albert Z. Carr, Is Business Bluffing Ethical?, 46 HARV. BUS. REV. 143 (1968).
34. Id. at 148.
35. Id. at 153.
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it is cheaper to engage in industrial espionage than to innovate, go
for it (as long as it is not against the law). "Espionage in business
is not an ethical problem; it's an established technique of business
competition." 3 6
Similarly, in The Ethics of Advocacy, 37 Charles Curtis caused con-
sternation among elite lawyers when he observed that lawyers are
not only better at lying than most people are, but that he could see
no ethical reason for lawyers not to lie:
Complete candor to anyone but ourselves is a virtue that be-
longs to the saints, to the secure, and to the very courageous.
Even when we do want to tell the truth, all of it, ultimately, we
see no reason why we should not take our own time, tell it as
skillfully and as gracefully as we can, and most of us doubt our
own ability to do this as well by ourselves and for ourselves as
another could do it for us. So we go to a lawyer. He will make a
better fist of it than we can.
I don't see why we should not come out roundly and say that
one of the functions of a lawyer is to lie for his client; and on
rare occasions, as I think I have shown, I believe it is. Happily
they are few and far between, only when his duty gets him into
a corner or puts him on the spot. 38
This is not an amoral system, but a special role-differentiated one,
according to Curtis: "We are not dealing with the morals which gov-
ern a man acting for himself, but with the ethics of advocacy. We
are talking about the special moral code which governs a man who
is acting for another." 39
Since Curtis's time there has been a sea change in the law gov-
erning lawyers, from essentially informal norms of etiquette to a
comprehensive system of binding legal rules backed by sanctions.
In the case of lies told by lawyers to courts, or lawyers knowingly
presenting false testimony, the penalties are severe, and it is simply
36. Id. at 146 (quoting a pseudonymous "Midwestern [business] executive").
37. Charles P. Curtis, The Ethics ofAdvocacy, 4 STAN. L. REV. 3 (1951).
38. Id. at 8-9. The Harvard Crimson reported that the head of the Massachusetts Bar
had this to say in response:
That statement is so contrary to every concept of legal ethics as I read and understand
them. . . Either Mr. Curtis' views are in conflict with those of every decent member of
the legal profession, or he has expressed them in a manner that can only be described
as inordinately stupid.
Curtis Statement on Court Lying Mums Law Professors, HARV. CRIMSON (Sept. 27, 1952).
39. Curtis, supra note 37, at 16.
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not the case that a lawyer may lie with impunity for her client. 40
But never mind the law. Curtis's point, and Carr's as well, is that
a professional is not properly subject to criticism appealing to the
usual moral categories of lies, deceit, trickery, manipulation, and so
on. On the familiar Kantian understanding, the wrongfulness of
lying is related to the way it denies the humanity-the capacity for
free, rational choice-of its intended victim; it would be impossible
for the victim to give uncoerced assent to a way of being treated that
involves robbing the victim of her capacity to act in another way. 41
Lying, along with violence, is a form of deliberate assault on an-
other, treats the other as merely a means and not an end in herself,
and represents an unjustified assumption of power by the liar over
the victim. 42 It destroys the trust that is a precondition for com-
municating information and maintaining social relationships. 43
These considerations, however, all belong to the domain of ordinary
morality; they are not necessarily within the constitutive norms
that govern the "game" of business, law, or some other practice such
as political campaigning or speaking on behalf of the government
at a press conference. Carr's argument, however, is that because
certain "moves" with the "game" of law, governance, political cam-
paigning, and so on, are permitted, someone who makes those
moves should not be subject to moral criticism.
Several conditions must be satisfied before the appeal to the rules
of the game can establish a permission for what would otherwise be
wrongful conduct. 4 4 The players must have given actual consent to
play the game, with knowledge of what the rules permit and re-
quire. They must have a genuine option not to play the game. Ar-
guably any "move" within the game that causes harm to a player
must be necessary for the ongoing success or stability of the game
as a mutually advantageous scheme of cooperation. These condi-
tions are readily satisfied for a game like poker or pickup basket-
ball-where a player can expect a certain amount of shoving and
the occasional thrown elbow-but it is much less clear that moral
40. See W. BRADLEY WENDEL, PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY: EXAMPLES &
EXPLANATIONS 233-60 (5th ed. 2016).
41. See, e.g., CHRISTINE M. KORSGAARD, Two Arguments Against Lying, in CREATING THE
KINGDOM OF ENDS 335, 346-47 (1996); Christine M. Korsgaard, The Right to Lie: Kant on
Dealing with Evil, 15 PHIL. & PUB. AFF. 325, 331-32 (1986).
42. SISSELA BOK, LYING: MORAL CHOICE IN PUBLIC AND PRIVATE LIFE 18, 22 (1978).
43. SEANA VALENTINE SHIFFRIN, SPEECH MATTERS: ON LYING, MORALITY, AND THE LAW
9-12 (2014).
44. See ARTHUR ISAK APPLBAUM, ETHICS FOR ADVERSARIES: THE MORALITY OF ROLES IN
PUBLIC AND PROFESSIONAL LIFE 113-24 (1999).
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permissions can be generated using the same pattern of justifica-
tion with respect to an arena of public life that is only metaphori-
cally a game. The element of genuine consent, for example, is likely
to be lacking where a party was compelled to participate by a legal
summons. In the usual example of settlement negotiations, a party
may have elected to attempt to mediate a resolution of the dispute,
but from the defendant's point of view, the lawsuit was initiated by
a compulsory process, and from the plaintiffs point of view, the de-
fendant's injurious conduct was not consensual. Thus, when a law-
yer claims permission to bluff or deceive the adversary, the analogy
of a poker game is not exactly fitting. The parties did not freely
choose to sit down at the table and subject themselves to deception
and manipulation. The game analogy is even more strained as ap-
plied to a large-scale cooperative scheme such as a political commu-
nity. As Hume argued, every actual government was founded "ei-
ther on usurpation or conquest, or both, without any pretence of a
fair consent or voluntary subjection of the people." 4 5 Other than
immigrants who voluntarily sought a new country of citizenship,
most of us have never expressly agreed to become "players" in the
"game" of American politics. Nor does the appeal to tacit consent
help, since most acts of receiving benefits from government are not
truly voluntary.46
A variation on the tacit consent argument for using only the rules
of the game to evaluate conduct is the familiar claim that "every-
body does it." This may be seen as a kind of reverse fairness argu-
ment. Generally, arguments from fairness posit a duty to cooperate
in a mutually beneficial project and not free-ride on the efforts of
others. 4 7 If a cooperative scheme breaks down, however, there is no
benefit to those who continue to comply with its requirements and
significant cost resulting from compliance. Under those circum-
stances, fairness would not require assuming additional obliga-
tions, but it is hard to see how fairness considerations would justify
engaging in conduct, like deception, that violates the rights of oth-
ers. 4 8 Can fairness considerations ever justify departures from im-
partial moral requirements? Partial compliance with the principle
of beneficence may limit the extent of the requirement to promote
45. David Hume, Of the Original Contract, reprinted in SOCIAL CONTRACT 151 (Ernest
Barker ed., 1947).
46. A. JOHN SIMMONS, MORAL PRINCIPLES AND POLITICAL OBLIGATIONS 83-95 (1979).
47. See, e.g., H.L.A. Hart, Are There Any Natural Rights?, 64 PHIL. REV. 175 (1955); JOHN
RAWLS, Legal Obligation and the Duty of Fair Play, in COLLECTED PAPERS (Samuel Freeman
ed., 1999).
48. See ROBERT NOZICK, ANARCHY, STATE, AND UTOPIA 92-95 (1974).
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the well-being of others. 4 9 That is very different from the claim that
violations of rights by others will excuse one's own violation of a
victim's rights. Even if violating A's rights will result in fewer
rights violations overall (i.e., will protect B, C, and D from having
their rights violated), it would impermissibly treat A merely as a
means to the ends of B, C, and D to violate her rights.5 0 If the
wrongfulness of lying or deception consists in violating the moral
agency of the listener, who has a reason to seek the content of the
speaker's mind (at least under some circumstances),5 1 then it
should not matter that lying and deception are widespread. Un-
truthfulness does tend to undermine a social economy of trust, but
it is also a wrong within the speaker-listener relationship because
it interferes with the listener's legitimate interest in knowing the
content of the speaker's beliefs.
A better argument, still in the neighborhood of "rules of the
game," is that some apparent instances of wrongdoing actually do
not count as wrongdoing within a justified social practice. Carr's
example of bluffing in poker is an obvious analogy; bluffing isn't
really lying-it is misrepresenting the value of one's hand in a con-
text in which other players know not to rely on any player's repre-
sentations of the value of her hand. As we shift the evaluation from
games with clearly defined rules to more complex practices in which
the rules are contested, however, it is important not to make un-
warranted assumptions about the actions that are permitted by the
norms of the practice. For example, a plaintiffs lawyer may tell the
defendant's insurer that "my client won't settle for a penny less
than $100,000," even though the lawyer had previously been given
authorization by the client to settle for any amount over $50,000. A
comment to the anti-deception provision of the rules of professional
conduct applicable in most states simply excludes that statement
from the definition of a false statement of material fact:
Under generally accepted conventions in negotiation, certain
types of statements ordinarily are not taken as statements of
material fact. . . . [A] party's intentions as to an acceptable set-
tlement of a claim are ordinarily in this category[.] 5 2
Under the rules of the applicable game, as stated by the comment
to the anti-deception rule, the lawyer's statement is not a false
49. See generally LIAM B. MURPHY, MORAL DEMANDS IN NONIDEAL THEORY (2000).
50. See APPLBAUM, supra note 44, at 138-43.
51. SHIFFRIN, supra note 43, at 9.
52. MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT, r. 4.1 cmt. 2 (AM. BAR ASS'N 1983).
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statement at all. Other than clearly defined exceptions such as
statements about acceptable settlements, however, lawyers' decep-
tive statements may subject them to professional discipline or other
legal sanctions. 53 There may also be ambiguity or contestability in
the rules of the game. There is some debate, for example, concern-
ing whether lawyers may permissibly employ agents to engage in
deceptive investigative techniques. 54  The all-things-considered
moral permissibility of deception permitted by the norms of legal
practice remains an open question, but it also may be unclear
whether a particular act would be acceptable within the rules of the
game as it is presently constituted.
The important, and often overlooked, aspect of Carr's poker anal-
ogy is that the game itself must answer to standards of moral ac-
ceptability. Poker is a trivial example, but applied to public life
more generally, it is clear that public institutions and practices
must have a deeper moral teleology-they must be designed to
serve the purposes of a political community and its members.55 It
may be a feature of the design of these institutions and practices
that they exclude reference back to ordinary moral considerations
such as the prohibition on deception, relying instead on internal
53. See, e.g., Ausherman v. Bank of America Corp., 212 F. Supp. 2d 435 (D. Md. 2002).
A number of cases involve false statements about whether the lawyer's client had died before
a settlement was finalized. See, e.g., In re Lyons, 780 N.W.2d 629 (Minn. 2010); People v.
Rosen, 198 P.3d 116 (Colo. 2008); Kentucky Bar Ass'n v. Geisler, 938 S.W.2d 578 (Ky. 1997).
The ABA has stated that failure to disclose to opposing counsel that one's client has died is
tantamount to making a false statement of material fact under Rule 4.1. See ABA Comm'n
on Ethics & Profl Responsibility, Formal Op. 95-397 (1995).
54. See, e.g., Midwest Motor Sports v. Arctic Cat Sales, Inc., 347 F.3d 693 (8th Cir. 2003)
(lawyers hired former FBI agent, who misrepresented his identity and secretly taped conver-
sations; evidence excluded from proceedings); In re Ositis, 40 P.3d 500 (Or. 2002) (lawyer
may not direct investigator to pose as journalist); In re Gatti, 8 P.3d 966 (Or. 2000) (attorney
misrepresented his identity to medical records review company); Gidatex v. Campaniello Im-
ports Ltd., 82 F. Supp. 2d 119 (S.D.N.Y. 1999) (permitting deceptive investigation to deter-
mine compliance with civil consent decree); Apple Corps Ltd. v. Int'l Collectors Soc'y, 15 F.
Supp. 2d 456 (D.N.J. 1998) (permitting undercover investigation to ascertain violation of
consent decree regarding intellectual property); In re Air Crash Disaster Near Roselawn,
Indiana, 909 F. Supp. 1116 (N.D. Ill. 1995) (sanctioning plaintiffs' lawyers for hiring investi-
gators to conduct research on training received by pilots on conditions similar to those en-
countered in the accident leading to the litigation); Richardson v. Howard, 712 F.2d 319 (7th
Cir. 1983) (permitting the use of discrimination "testers" to uncover violations of civil-rights
statutes). Government lawyers have traditionally been permitted to direct undercover in-
vestigations and other law enforcement activities involving deception. See, e.g., D.C. Bar Op.
323 (2004) (federal government attorneys may use deceit if they reasonably believe their of-
ficial duties require it and their actions are authorized by law); Virginia State Bar Legal
Ethics Op. 1765 (2003).
55. NAGEL, supra note 30, at 82-83.
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rules of conduct that may permit certain categories of deceptive con-
duct.5 6 Adversarial practices within the legal system are often jus-
tified in this way. Consider one of the central instances of permis-
sible deception by lawyers-the representation of a criminal de-
fendant who has admitted to her factual guilt to the lawyer. The
defendant, nevertheless, has the right to demand a jury trial, to tes-
tify in her own defense, and, more broadly, to "put the state to its
proof' by insisting that the prosecution prove every element of the
offense beyond a reasonable doubt.5 7 There is a difference between
what might be termed "legal guilt" and factually having committed
an offense.
The norms of criminal defense advocacy, including qualified per-
mission to introduce evidence inconsistent with the guilt of the de-
fendant, is one way our legal system protects individuals against
the unrestrained power of the state.5 8 A lawyer may not introduce
evidence that the lawyer knows to be false, 59 but may the lawyer
introduce true evidence that supports a false inference? Arguably,
the answer is "yes" because persuading the jury that the state has
not proven its case beyond a reasonable doubt is possible only by
permitting defense lawyers to tell a coherent narrative inconsistent
with the state's evidence and theory of guilt.6 0 In ordinary moral
56. This pattern of argument is familiar from indirect consequentialism. See, e.g., John
Rawls, Two Concepts ofRules, 64 PHIL. REV. 3 (1955) (arguing that a utilitarian justification
can be given for practices, such as promising, that in operation exclude direct reference to
utilitarian considerations).
57. John B. Mitchell, Reasonable Doubts Are Where You Find Them: A Response to Pro-
fessor Subin's Position on the Criminal Lawyer's "Different Mission", 1 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS
339 (1987).
58. Id. at 341-42.
59. MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT r. 3.3(a) (AM. BAR ASS'N 1983); Nix v. Whiteside,
475 U.S. 157 (1986).
60. Mitchell's example involves a client accused of shoplifting an inexpensive Christmas
ornament. The client admits intending to steal the item. When she was stopped by the store
manager, however, the client had a ten-dollar bill in her pocket. The ethical issue concerns
the permissibility of making the following closing argument to the jury:
The prosecution claims my client stole an ornament for a Christmas tree. The prose-
cution further claims that when my client walked out of that store she intended to keep
it without paying. Now, maybe she did. None of us were there. On the other hand, she
had $10.00 in her pocket, which was plenty of money with which to pay for the orna-
ment without the risk of getting caught stealing. Also, she didn't try to conceal what
she was doing. She walked right out of the store holding it in her hand. Most of us have
come close to innocently doing the same thing. So, maybe she didn't. But then she cried
the minute she was stopped. She might have been feeling guilty. So, maybe she did.
On the other hand, she might just have been scared when she realized what had hap-
pened. After all, she didn't run away when she was left alone even though she knew
the manager was going to be occupied with a fire inside. So, maybe she didn't. The
point is that, looking at all the evidence, you're left with "maybe she intended to steal,
maybe she didn't." But, you knew that before the first witness was even sworn. The
prosecution has the burden, and he simply can't carry any burden let alone "beyond a
reasonable doubt" with a maybe she did, maybe she didn't case.
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terms, this would still count as deception because the lawyer's ob-
ject is to manipulate the listener (in this case, the jury) into forming
the false belief that the client did not do what the prosecution al-
leges. 61
However, the legal system works with the concept of legal, not
factual guilt. The concept of legal guilt, which plays an important
explanatory and justifying role in evaluating the lawyer's conduct,
is an artifact of the legal system and its constitutive rules. It does
not really have an analogue in ordinary morality. To the extent a
defense lawyer is justified morally in appealing to legal, not factual
guilt, it is because the role of criminal defense lawyer-and the as-
sociated permission to tell stories made up of true evidence that
support false inferences of factual innocence-is justified by politi-
cal ends such as protecting individuals against state power. 62 The
role in this case does create a moral permission to engage in what
would otherwise be wrongful deception, and the defense lawyer's
conduct should be evaluated on the basis of norms internal to the
legal system and its associated roles. This conclusion depends on
the justification of the system and its roles, without which the law-
yer is back in the predicament of being simply a deceiver. Within
the system, however, the lawyer may properly redescribe her aim
as protecting her client against abuses of power by putting the state
to its proof.
The idea is that ostensibly role-differentiated domains do not in-
sulate lawyers, journalists, businesspeople, and politicians from
ethical criticism. Instead, they substantially shift the locus of crit-
icism from individual acts to more general considerations of insti-
tution design. Charles Curtis can be accused of exaggerating when
he said that one of the functions of a lawyer is to lie for his or her
client. 63 It may be the case, however, that one of the functions of a
lawyer is to do something that, outside the context of the legal sys-
tem, would be counted as a lie. We tolerate lawyers engaging in
these practices not because we are indifferent to lying, but because
Mitchell, supra note 57, at 344-45. In ordinary moral terms, the defense lawyer's argument
is an attempt to deceive the jury into believing that there was an innocent explanation for
how the client ended up outside the store with the Christmas ornament in her possession.
The lawyer's justification is that the jury is not being asked to decide factual truth, but legal
truth-i.e., did the prosecution prove its case beyond a reasonable doubt?
61. See SHIFFRIN, supra note 43, at 22-23 (locating the wrongfulness of deception in vio-
lation of the duty to take care not to cause another to form false beliefs).
62. See DAVID LUBAN, LAWYERS AND JUSTICE 130-39 (1988) (arguing that an institutional
excuse for what would otherwise be wrongdoing in moral terms must follow a pattern in
which the institution is itself morally good, the role is required by the structure of the insti-
tution, and the action is required to support the end of the role).
63. See Curtis, supra note 37, at 9.
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we recognize that bluffing in negotiations and arguing for false in-
ferences are means to broader institutional ends such as protecting
liberty and enabling citizens to have access to the rights allocated
to them by law. The assessment of public actors as truthful or un-
truthful requires situating their conduct in context, including the
expectations and beliefs of others who participate in the relevant
social practices and institutions. 64 This contextual, community-
grounded evaluation also suggests that we may do better at realiz-
ing the value of truthfulness by instituting and reinforcing certain
methodologies and practices that are adapted to the obstacles one
is likely to encounter to the maintenance of truth. 65
1II. TRUTHFULNESS WITHOUT OBJECTIVITY
Invocations of the idea of truth in public discourse have a ten-
dency to become bogged down in debates over objectivity. Is a belief
(or a proposition, or a sentence) true just in cases where it corre-
sponds with an independently existing reality? This is certainly a
commonsensical view, but it leads to familiar problems such as
characterizing just what it means for a mental picture to correspond
to something in external reality, how an object can be similar to its
mental representation, how the content of a belief is determined by
the external world, how we can occupy distinct standpoints from
which we judge that p and that it is true that p, and so on. 66 Fasci-
nating as these issues are in their own right, the problem of truth
and objectivity in practical ethics is not best understood as seeking
to explain how moral judgments are related to the external world.6 7
Those issues, to quote Joshua Cohen, are "politically idle." 6 8 Ra-
ther, the value of truth in law, government, the media, and similar
public domains depends on the idea of public justification. 6 9 Politi-
cal liberalism is founded on the mutual recognition of members of
64. See Catherine Z. Elgin, Williams on Truthfulness, 55 PHIL. Q. 343, 347 (2005).
65. Id. at 347-48.
66. See, e.g., DONALD DAVIDSON, INQUIRIES INTO TRUTH AND INTERPRETATION (1984);
HILARY PUTNAM, REASON, TRUTH AND HISTORY (1981). For a helpful overview of contempo-
rary theories of truth, see Simon Blackburn & Keith Simmons, Introduction, in TRUTH 1
(Simon Blackburn & Keith Simmons eds., 1999).
67. My claim is not that these issues are not interesting, only that they can be a distrac-
tion when working on topics within practical ethics. For good summaries of the theoretical
issues, see ESSAYS ON MORAL REALISM (Geoffrey Sayre-McCord ed., 1988); Joseph Raz, Notes
on Value and Objectivity, in OBJECTIVITY IN LAW AND MORALS 194 (Brian Leiter ed., 2007);
Geoffrey Sayre-McCord, Moral Realism, in THE OXFORD HANDBOOK OF ETHICAL THEORY 39
(David Copp ed., 2006).
68. Joshua Cohen, Truth and Public Reason, 37 PHIL. & PUB. AFF. 2, 15 (2009).
69. See RAINER FORST, CONTEXTS OF JUSTICE: POLITICAL PHILOSOPHY BEYOND
LIBERALISM AND COMMUNITARIANISM 185-93 (John M. M. Farrell trans., 2002) (1994).
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our political community as free and equal. 70 We reason as citizens,
not as isolated individuals, about the rights and duties owed among
members of a community. Insofar as we participate in public life,
we recognize an obligation to justify our actions to each other on the
basis of reasons that can, in principle, be shared. A proposition is
true if reasonable and rational persons would endorse it, or at least
sufficiently narrow their disagreement about it, upon reflection and
consideration of the facts that bear upon the matter.7 1
One might say, with Rawls, that this is all that is needed for a
political conception of objectivity. That is acceptable as a manner
of speaking as long as it is understood that the notion of objectivity
is related to the maintenance of a particular form of life-a liberal
political community whose members regard each other as free and
equal. It follows from this political conception of the value of truth-
fulness that there are better and worse ways of handling disagree-
ment among members of the community. As Bernard Williams
writes in a brilliant paper:
Many different things have been discussed as the question of
objectivity, but they all tend either to come to nothing, or to
come back to one issue: the proper understanding of ethical dis-
agreement. Some philosophers have been very exercised, for in-
stance, with the question whether moral judgments can be true
or false. . . . The concepts of truth and falsehood carry with
them the ambitions of aiming at the truth and avoiding, so far
as we can, error; the question must be, how those ambitions
could be carried out with regard to ethical thought. I see no way
of pursuing that question, which does not lead back to ques-
tions such as these: if an ethical disagreement arises, must one
party think the other in error? What is the content of that
thought? What sorts of discussions or explorations might, given
the particular subject matter, lead one or both of them out of
error?7 2
The value of truth is related to the avoidance of error, but in a com-
munity characterized by ethical pluralism, empirical uncertainty,
and resulting dissensus and conflict-which Rawls refers to as the
burdens of judgment 73-it is not a straightforward matter to con-
duct a discussion that is likely to lead the participants out of error.
70. See JOHN RAWLS, POLITICAL LIBERALISM 29, 33, 38 (1993).
71. Id. at 119.
72. BERNARD WILLIAMS, Saint-Just's Illusion, in MAKING SENSE OF HUMANITY 135, 145
(1995).
73. RAWLS, supra note 70, at 56-58.
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In fact, it may be necessary to bracket the idea of truth altogether
and work with a different regulative ideal, such as reasonable-
ness. 7 4 Principles of reasonableness would then be related to formal
principles such as reciprocity and generality, and political ideals
such as fairness, dignity, and equality, which are respected by
treating others with respect in conditions of disagreement and con-
flict.75
Williams rightly observes that we have debates about politics and
morality only within an actual social world "within which we en-
counter various political and ethical demands and ideals, argue
with them, adapt ourselves to them, try to form a conception of an
acceptable life within them."7 6 Pervasive disregard for the virtues
of truthfulness threatens to pull apart the community that is sus-
tained by the practices of encountering varying demands and ide-
als, wrestling with them, and constructing individual and social
conceptions of well-lived lives. The response to this threat is not to
double down on the abstract notion of objectivity. It is instead to
focus attention on truthfulness as a cluster of "virtues and prac-
tices, and ideas that go with them, that express the concern to tell
the truth."7 7 These virtues and practices are political in the sense
that they derive their intelligibility from the problems they are
aimed at solving.78 I like to quote Hugo Grotius's characterization
of people as "quarrelsome but socially minded beings."7 9 The liberal
political project, as carried out by thinkers from Rousseau and
Locke through Gauthier and Rawls, aims to reconcile individuality
(and associated values such as liberty and autonomy) with the de-
mands of living in a society with other individuals who must be rec-
ognized as in some sense equals. Williams gives a vivid description
of the problem to which truthfulness is the solution. In its modern
form, the problem of relating to others in circumstances of coopera-
tion and trust takes two forms-political and personal. The politi-
cal problem consists of "finding a basis for a shared life which will
be neither too oppressively coercive . . . nor dependent on mythical
legitimations."8 0 The personal problem is that of "stabilizing the
74. FORST, supra note 69, at 186-87.
75. Id. at 192-93.
76. WILLIAMS, Saint-Just's, supra note 72, at 139.
77. WILLIAMS, TRUTH, supra note 27, at 20.
78. Id. at 208-09 (arguing that political truthfulness is associated with other values and
expressed in institutions and practices that stand against tyranny).
79. See J. B. SCHNEEWIND, THE INVENTION OF AUTONOMY: A HISTORY OF MODERN MORAL
PHILOSOPHY 72 (1998) (citing this observation as one of the distinctively modern insights in
moral philosophy).
80. WILLIAMS, TRUTH, supra note 27, at 201.
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self into a form that will indeed fit with these social and political
ideals."81
For present purposes at least, I am less concerned with the per-
sonal problem, which pertains to theories of education and culture
that are beyond my expertise as a legal scholar. I do think it is
possible, however, to understand many of the institutions and prac-
tices associated with the legal system as aimed at sustaining com-
munal life without resorting either to coercion or mystification.
Truthfulness is therefore related to the problem of constructing and
supporting legitimate political institutions in a pluralistic demo-
cratic political community. Legitimacy, for its part, may be en-
hanced by relying on procedures that embody Williams's insight
that the ideal of truth is oriented toward leading people out of error.
An under-appreciated contribution of the legal system to the legiti-
macy of a democratic political order is the process of adjudication,
which allows citizens to present claims against the state, or against
each other, for resolution on a reasoned basis, relying on both em-
pirical facts and normative principles. 82 The parties to an adjudi-
cated proceeding must give reasons that are well-supported in fact
and law for the result they are seeking; judges, in turn, owe the
parties a reasoned decision that takes into account the competing
positions, the evidence for both sides, and the legal principles that
bear on the resolution of the dispute. The process of adjudication
"allows rival and competing claims to confront and engage with one
another in an orderly process . . . without degenerating into an in-
coherent shouting match." 83 Not only that, but the law also pre-
sents its claims as something people can make sense of and comply
with as rational agents, as opposed to being coerced or terrified into
following the command of a sovereign.
In order to function as a means of ordering in a society of free and
equal citizens, who are presumed to be capable of using their facul-
ties of reason to understand and comply with the law as it applies
to their own situations, legal procedures must take truthfulness as
a regulative ideal.84 Courts require the parties to certify that the
81. Id.
82. See Jeremy Waldron, Thoughtfulness and the Rule of Law, 18 BRIT. ACAD. REV. 1, 7
(2011) (discussing Lon L. Fuller, The Forms and Limits ofAdjudication, 92 HARV. L. REV.
353 (1978)). See also Burton Dreben, On Rawls and Political Liberalism, in THE CAMBRIDGE
COMPANION TO RAWLS 316, 339-40 (Samuel Freeman ed., 2003) (analogizing Rawlsian public
reasons to the kinds of considerations on which a judge would rely in resolving a litigated
dispute).
83. Waldron, supra note 82, at 7.
84. See W. Bradley Wendel, Whose Truth? Objective and Subjective Perspectives on
Truthfulness in Advocacy, 28 YALE J. L. & HUMAN. 105 (2016) (exploring some of these
themes in connection with lawyers' ethical obligations of truthfulness).
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factual contentions they make have sufficient grounding, and that
their legal arguments are well-founded in existing law, or a good
faith argument for its extension, modification, or reversal.85 This is
not to say that the parties may only bring claims grounded in truth.
Even in civil litigation-setting aside the special case of the adjudi-
cation of criminal cases, discussed above, with its distinctive back-
ground of constitutional rights of the accused-lawyers need only
satisfy themselves that the "facts" they advance have evidentiary
support. 86 "Evidentiary support" is a much lower threshold than
reasonable belief, let alone knowledge. But it is not nothing, and
the parties may not rely on fanciful stories without an adequate
factual foundation. Legal arguments must also be true, in a sense,
to existing law. There must be some basis for claiming that a party
has an entitlement that will be respected by the court. These norms
of procedure are familiar to lawyers, but their significance in rela-
tion to democratic legitimacy often goes unrecognized.87 The point
I want to emphasize here is that legal procedures have a built-in
relationship with what Williams contends are the two hallmarks of
truth: Sincerity (saying what you mean, which sustains social
trust8 8 ) and Accuracy (getting it right, which allows members of a
community to pool reliable information about the world89). To illus-
trate this connection, I would like to close with an example from
recent political life, President Trump's travel ban executive orders.
The government's position concerning the lawfulness of the orders,
and the response of courts to those arguments, provide a compelling
example of the power of truthful practices to resist deception and
bullshit in public life.
IV. PEEKING BEHIND THE CURTAIN OF BULLSHIT
As a candidate, Trump promised to bar entry into the United
States, either of Muslims or people from countries with a history of
supporting terrorism (which is pretty much a code word for "Mus-
lims" to his base of voters). 90 As President, however, he possesses
85. See MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT r. 3.1 (AM. BAR ASS'N 1983).
86. FED. R. Civ. P. 11(b)(3).
87. But see DANIEL MARKOVITS, A MODERN LEGAL ETHICS (2008) (putting legitimacy at
the forefront of a conception of ethical lawyering, which emphasizes the obligation to tell
clients' stories faithfully).
88. See WILLIAMS, TRUTH, supra note 27, at 11, 87, 96.
89. See id. at 11, 124-26.
90. See, e.g., Abby Phillip & Abigail Hauslohner, Trump on the Future of Proposed Mus-
lim Ban, Registry: 'You Know My Plans', WASH. POST (Dec. 22, 2016); Jenna Johnson, Donald
Trump is Expanding His Muslim Ban, Not Rolling It Back, WASH. POST (July 24, 2016) (quot-
ing Trump saying, in his acceptance speech at the Republican National Convention, that the
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broad statutory authority to bar the entry of an alien or class of
aliens into the United States, upon his finding that their entry
would be detrimental to the interests of the United States. 91 The
Supreme Court has taken an extremely deferential approach to the
power of the executive under this section and has repeatedly denied
challenges based on discriminatory animus. The leading case, aris-
ing out of a First Amendment claim filed by a Marxist professor
prevented from entering the United States to give lectures, requires
only that the President articulate a "facially legitimate and bona
fide" reason for denying entry into the U.S. 9 2 The Court recently
reaffirmed that standard, and in a concurring opinion, Justice Ken-
nedy stated that courts will not look behind the articulated stand-
ard to find improper motives. 93 Courts generally decline to engage
in "judicial psychoanalysis" to root out evidence of discriminatory
intent. 94 One would therefore expect courts to treat the Trump
country "must immediately suspend immigration from any nation that has been compro-
mised by terrorism until such time it's proven that vetting mechanisms have been put in
place"). As a candidate, Trump's first statement on the issue had been a call for a "total and
complete" ban on Muslims entering the United States. See Jenna Johnson & David Weigel,
Donald Trump Calls for 'Total' Ban on Muslims Entering United States, WASH. POST (Dec.
8, 2015). Trump's political advisor Rudy Giuliani claimed that Trump had asked him how to
implement a Muslim ban lawfully. See Rebecca Savransky, Giuliani: Trump Asked Me How
to Do a Muslim Ban 'Legally', HILL (Jan. 29, 2017, 8:48 AM EST). Trump promised that once
the new "extreme vetting" procedures were in place, his administration would give priority
for admission to Christians. See Carol Morello, Trump Signs Order Temporarily Halting
Admission of Refugees, Promises Priority for Christians, WASH. POST (Jan. 27, 2017).
91. 8 U.S.C. § 1182(f). This statutory authority is limited by a provision elsewhere in the
Immigration and Nationality Act prohibiting discrimination on the basis of national origin
in the issuance of immigrant visas. See 8 U.S.C. § 1152(a)(1)(A). A district court in Mary-
land, considering the second executive order, held that the prohibition on discrimination in
issuing immigrant visas, being narrower than the broad authority under Section 1182(f),
controlled with respect to the President's authority to issue immigrant visas. See Int'l Refu-
gee Assistance Project v. Trump, 241 F. Supp. 3d 539, 554-55 (D. Md.), aff'd in part, vacated
in part, 857 F.3d 554 (4th Cir. 2017), vacated and remanded, 138 S. Ct. 353 (2017). Because
the district court held that the limitation in Section 1152(a)(1)(A) did not restrict the Presi-
dent's authority to bar entry, the Fourth Circuit did not address the statutory construction
argument in its review of the President's executive order, which sought to ban entry alto-
gether of citizens of certain designated countries. See Int'l Refugee Assistance Project v.
Trump, 857 F.3d 554, 580-81 (4th Cir.), vacated and remanded, 138 S. Ct. 353 (2017).
92. Kleindienst v. Mandel, 408 U.S. 753, 770 (1972).
93. Kerry v. Din, 135 S. Ct. 2128, 2140 (2015) (Kennedy, J., concurring). In a case arising
in the Clinton administration, the Court similarly refused to look behind facially legitimate
reasons for executive action in the context of immigration and national security:
The Executive should not have to disclose its "real" reasons for deeming nationals of a
particular country a special threat - or indeed for simply wishing to antagonize a par-
ticular foreign country by focusing on that country's nationals - and even if it did dis-
close them a court would be ill equipped to determine their authenticity and utterly
unable to assess their adequacy.
Reno v. American-Arab Anti-Discrimination Committee, 525 U.S. 471, 491 (1999).
94. McCreary Cty. v. ACLU, 545 U.S. 844, 862 (2005).
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travel ban as they did a policy established by the Bush administra-
tion, called National Security Entry-Exit Registration System
(NSEERS), which, among other provisions, required the registra-
tion, fingerprinting, and questioning of aliens present in the U.S.
from Muslim-majority countries and North Korea who were males
over the age of 16.95 Federal courts sustained the registry features
of the NSEERS program against due process and equal protection
challenges and claims that the program amounted to racial profil-
ing. 96
Trump's first travel ban order, entered soon after he took office,
prohibited entry into the United States by all refugees and all citi-
zens of seven majority-Muslim countries, even those with lawful
permanent residence in the United States.97 The enactment of the
order led to scenes of chaos at airports and highly unusual (and
gratifying) images of lawyers rushing to the assistance of travelers
affected by the ban. It was subsequently enjoined nationwide by a
district judge in the Western District of Washington, and that in-
junction was upheld by the Ninth Circuit. 98 Following the decision
of the Ninth Circuit to leave the injunction in place, Trump issued
a second executive order narrowing somewhat the scope of the first
order, providing for limited waivers on a case-by-case basis, and in-
95. See Rajah v. Mukasey, 544 F.3d 427, 433-34 (2d Cir. 2008) (describing program); see
also Registration of Certain Nonimmigrant Aliens from Designated Countries, 67 Fed. Reg.
70526, 70526-70527 (Nov. 22, 2002). The NSEERS also required registration, fingerprinting,
and photographs at the port of entry. Countries covered by this provision, depending on the
date of entry into the United States, were Afghanistan, Algeria, Bahrain, Eritrea, Iran, Iraq,
Lebanon, Libya, Morocco, North Korea, Oman, Pakistan, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, Somalia, Su-
dan, Syria, Tunisia, the United Arab Emirates, and Yemen. See Rajah, 544 F.3d at 433 n.3
(citing 8 C.F.R. 264.1(f)).
96. See, e.g., Kandamar v. Gonzales, 464 F.3d 65, 73-74 (1st Cir. 2006) (holding there was
no equal protection violation in requiring aliens to appear for interviews, even though
NSEERS applies only to certain countries); Ali v. Gonzales, 440 F.3d 678, 680 n.4 (5th Cir.
2006) ("We note that NSEERS's nationality classification has been repeatedly upheld by this
Court and others against constitutional attack.") (citations omitted). The Department of
Homeland Security under the Obama Administration rescinded the regulations relating to
the NSEERS. See Removal of Regulations Relating to Special Registration Process for Cer-
tain Nonimmigrants, 81 Fed. Reg. 94231, 94231 (Dec. 23, 2016). Reporting at the time sug-
gested that the Obama Administration's determination to shut down NSEERS was moti-
vated by the enthusiasm shown by Trump political advisor Kris Kobach, who had a role in
the Bush Administration's implementation of NSEERS, for using it as a template for Trump's
promised Muslim ban. See Abigail Hauslohner & Ellen Nakashima, Obama Administration
Tries to Shut Down Visitor Registry Program Before Trump Takes Office, WASH. POST (Dec.
22, 2016).
97. See, e.g., Michael D. Shear, Nicholas Kulish & Alan Feuer, Judge Blocks Trump Or-
der on Refugees Amid Chaos and Outcry Worldwide, N.Y. TIMES (Jan. 28, 2017).
98. See State of Washington v. Trump, No. C17-0141JLR, 2017 WL 462040, at *2 (W.D.
Wash. Feb. 3, 2017), stay pending appeal denied, 847 F.3d 1151 (9th Cir. 2017), reconsidera-
tion en banc denied, 858 F.3d 1168, 1168 (9th Cir. 2017).
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cluding additional factual findings intended to support the asser-
tion of executive power in the interest of national security; it, too,
was enjoined by a district court, this time in Maryland, 99 and the
injunction was affirmed by the Fourth Circuit.100 It is the Fourth
Circuit opinion that provides some grounds for hoping that robust
institutions and practices responsive to the value of legality can en-
force standards of truthfulness against an onslaught of bullshit.
The court's opinion fully accepted the framework just described,
which gives the President broad statutory authority to bar entry of
non-citizens if he believes doing so will be in the interests of the
United States, and which instructs reviewing courts to defer to a
facially legitimate and bona fide reason for the President's action. 101
The second travel ban order includes a recitation of facts supposedly
justifying restrictions on entry from several countries, identified as
state sponsors of terrorism. 102 On their face, these reasons would
justify the denial of permission to enter the United States. But the
court also included a lengthy and detailed compilation of state-
ments made by Trump, both as a candidate and after taking office,
tending to show that he had always intended to enact a "Muslim
ban," regardless of whether there was a bona fide national security
justification for doing SO. 1 0 3 One might therefore put the question
this way: When may a court inquire into whether the reasons given
by the President are not in good faith, even though they are facially
legitimate? As Ninth Circuit Judge Bybee argued, dissenting in a
proceeding involving the first travel ban order:
Even if we have questions about the basis for the President's
ultimate findings-whether it was a "Muslim ban" or some-
thing else-we do not get to peek behind the curtain. So long
as there is one "facially legitimate and bona fide" reason for the
President's actions, our inquiry is at an end. 10 4
99. See Int'l Refugee Assistance Project v. Trump, 241 F. Supp. 3d 539 (D. Md.), aff'd in
part, vacated in part, 857 F.3d 554 (4th Cir. 2017), vacated and remanded, 138 S. Ct. 353
(2017).
100. Int'l Refugee Assistance Project v. Trump, 857 F.3d 554, 572 (4th Cir.), vacated and
remanded, 138 S. Ct. 353 (2017). The Supreme Court order vacating the Fourth Circuit's
decision was based on the expiration of the executive order on September 24, 2017.
101. Id. at 590. Dissenting from the court's denial of reconsideration en banc, Ninth Cir-
cuit Judge Jay Bybee provided a forceful case for deference to the President's authority under
Section 1182(f), Kleindienst v. Mandel, 408 U.S. 753 (1972), and Kerry v. Din, 135 S. Ct. 2128
(2015). See Trump, 858 F.3d at 1179-84 (Bybee, J., dissenting).
102. See Int'l Refugee Assistance Project, 857 F.3d at 573-74.
103. Id. at 575-77.
104. Trump, 858 F.3d at 1183 (Bybee, J., dissenting).
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That is certainly a reasonable summary of the law prior to the
Trump presidency. The Fourth Circuit, reviewing the second travel
ban order, was even willing to concede (as I think it must) that the
asserted national security interests are facially legitimate.10 5 But
then the court also reached the truly remarkable conclusion that
the President had not offered this justification in good faith. It
acknowledged that Justice Kennedy's concurring opinion in Kerry
v. Din set a high bar for a claim of bad faith to be justiciable but
concluded that the plaintiffs had plausibly alleged bad faith with
particularity.10 6 It did so by peeking behind the curtain of facially
legitimate justifications, to use Judge Bybee's language, and find-
ing what the President said about the reasons for the travel ban
were not the real reasons at all. In fact, he was motivated by the
desire to keep a promise to his supporters to engage in invidious
discrimination against adherents of a particular religion.
Think about that for a minute. Nine judges (out of thirteen) on a
federal court of appeals determined that the plaintiffs are likely to
succeed on the merits of their argument that the President is lying
about the reasons for issuing the executive orders.1 07 Saying some-
one acted in bad faith is a big deal, but a statement that strong may
be what is needed in order to serve the more general values of a
liberal democratic society. The Fourth Circuit opinion can be un-
derstood as doing exactly what Bernard Williams recommended in
his Saint-Just's Illusion paper, namely, directing the attention of
the disputing parties toward those considerations that would lead
them out of error.10 8 As is generally true in litigated disputes, one
of the parties is right and the other wrong: Either the President has
the inherent executive power and statutory authorization to bar en-
try of certain classes of non-citizens, or he does not. But if the Pres-
ident says one thing and does another, by giving one justification
for his decision in a formal legal document while offering a very dif-
ferent explanation to his base of supporters, the social process of
communicating information to others breaks down. Among other
105. Int'l Refugee Assistance Project, 857 F.3d at 591.
106. Id. at 592 (citing Kerry, 135 S. Ct. at 2141 (Kennedy, J., concurring)).
107. Six judges joined in full in Judge Gregory's opinion for the majority. Id. at 572 n.1.
Judge Keenan, in a separate concurring opinion joined by Judge Thacker, concluded that the
reasoning underlying the executive order did not pass the "bona fide" test. See id. at 606
(Keenan, J., concurring). Judge Thacker's concurrence limited the evidence of invidious dis-
crimination to statements made by President Trump after he took office, excluding state-
ments made on the campaign trail, but nevertheless still found a substantial likelihood of
success on the merits of the plaintiffs' bad faith argument. Id. at 630-33 (Thacker, J., con-
curring).
108. WILLIAMS, Saint-Just's, supra note 72, at 145.
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functions, speech is intended to serve the human interest in acquir-
ing and sharing true information. 109 The President's words are sup-
posed to communicate something to others about his beliefs and in-
tentions, appeal to facts about the world, and incorporate values
that justify his actions.110 Any interested audience, including a re-
viewing court, non-citizens affected by the order, or the general pop-
ulation of voters, should be able to make sense of the President's
actions. Only if there is some relationship between the President's
words and reality would it be possible for any other institution to
check the power of the Executive Branch. To continue Judge
Bybee's metaphor, maybe there is no curtain to peek behind if the
President has not bothered to offer an explanation for his actions
that could constitute a facially legitimate and bona fide reason.
The Trump Administration issued a third travel ban order, which
was immediately enjoined by federal courts; the Supreme Court
granted certiorari to consider the constitutionality of the revised or-
der, which was accompanied by a much more fully developed rec-
ord.111 Although lower federal courts had reacted with considerable
skepticism to the government's claim to have a facially legitimate
and good faith reason for the travel ban, a majority of the Court
found that the President was still owed deference in matters related
to immigration and national security. 112 The key to Chief Justice
Roberts's opinion for the majority was the record of an extensive
factfinding process, which the majority referred to as a "worldwide,
multi-agency review," 113 aimed at supporting the national-security
rationale for the order. Justice Sotomayor's dissenting opinion calls
this a "blinkered" approach to deference-too willing to accept what
any reasonable observer would recognize as a pretext for Trump's
desire to fulfill a campaign promise. 1 14 In response to this argu-
ment, and Justice Sotomayor's invocation of the Korematsu deci-
sion, Chief Justice Roberts says something extremely interesting,
apropos the rule of law: "The entry suspension is an act that is well
within executive authority and could have been taken by any other
109. WILLIAMS, supra note 27, at 126.
110. See id. at 233-37.
111. See Hawaii v. Trump, 265 F. Supp. 3d 1140, 1145 (D. Haw. 2017), aff'd in part, va-
cated in part 878 F.3d 662 (9th Cir. 2017), cert. granted, 138 S. Ct. 923 (2018).
112. See Trump v. Hawaii, 138 S. Ct. 2392 (2018).
113. Id. at 2408; see also id. at 2421 (again referring to "a worldwide review process un-
dertaken by multiple Cabinet officials and their agencies").
114. Trump v. Hawaii, 138 S. Ct. 2392, 2438 n.3 (2018) (Sotomayor, J., dissenting); see
also id. at 2448 ("By blindly accepting the Government's misguided invitation to sanction a
discriminatory policy motivated by animosity toward a disfavored group, all in the name of
a superficial claim of national security, the Court redeploys the same dangerous logic under-
lying Korematsu and merely replaces one 'gravely wrong' decision with another.").
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President-the only question is evaluating the actions of this par-
ticular President in promulgating an otherwise valid Proclama-
tion."1 15
The rhetorical opposition between the authority that could have
been exercised by "any other President" and the action taken by
"this particular President" is a revealing commentary not only on
Trump's bullshit, but also on a way for a liberal democracy to avoid
drowning in it. The obligation of other actors within the Executive
Branch, and reviewing courts, is to ensure that there is sufficient
legal authority for the President's actions. The standard of review
is objective and sometimes counterfactual-could a well-motivated
President have ordered this particular action within the exercise of
his statutory and inherent authority? Although the Court majority
does not peek behind the curtain, its opinion should be read as set-
ting a high bar for other government officials to ensure that there
is a sufficient basis for actions ordered by a whimsical President
who is unconcerned by the requirements of truth. In this way, the
Supreme Court travel ban decision underscores the value of the po-
litical ethics of truthfulness.
Some commentators have suggested that the deference tradition-
ally accorded to the President by the other two branches of govern-
ment rests on the assumption that the President will comply with
his "oath to faithfully execute [his] office."1 16 They ask whether "a
bullshitter, whose entire method of engaging with the world is in-
compatible with the concept of fidelity and whose fundamental slip-
periness and laxity in shouldering responsibility makes impossible
the notion of 'taking care,"'117 can comply with a solemn pledge of
faithfulness to the demands of the office. But the point I want to
close with is less about the dangers of bullshit, which are readily
apparent, and more about the value of the legal system and the
ideal of legality in a political environment characterized by slipper-
iness, or even contempt, for the very idea of truth. Perhaps by fo-
cusing more directly on the virtues of the rule of law we can avoid
getting bogged down in competing assertions that a claim is "fake
news" or some public actor is biased. Although the rule of law is
often understood in formal terms, as involving something like Lon
Fuller's eight criteria of legality, or else as a requirement that the
law be capable of determinate meaning in contested cases, an un-
derappreciated aspect of the rule of law is the maintenance of a
115. Trump v. Hawaii, 138 S. Ct. 2392, 2423 (2018).
116. Benjamin Wittes & Quinta Jurecic, What Happens When We Don't Believe the Presi-
dent's Oath?, LAWFARE (Mar. 3, 2017, 12:30 PM).
117. Id.
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structure in which evidence is presented and evaluated.118 The re-
quirement that the parties and the adjudicator give reasons turns
out to be surprisingly powerful. Reasoned arguments require a con-
nection with empirical reality that can withstand scrutiny in the
form of introduction of contrary evidence, challenges for unreliabil-
ity or bias, and exclusion of irrelevant considerations. Picking up
on Williams's point that we encounter moral and political ideals
only within an actual, lived form of life, 119 the legal system exem-
plifies a form of life in which the ideal of truthfulness is taken quite
seriously, because of its relationship to the social values secured by
the rule of law. A form of life which insists that a system of logic,
rules, and procedures be insulated from manipulation and gross
abuses is likely to be one in which citizens are protected from arbi-
trary power. 120 Doing so requires concern for truth, but not neces-
sarily worrying about metaphysical ideals like objectivity. Rather,
truthfulness is a characteristic of a well-functioning legal system.
V. CONCLUSION
Ironically, despite the frequently-expressed concern about the
role-differentiated morality of the legal profession, the distinctive
ethical obligations of lawyers may in some cases reflect a height-
ened concern for ethical ideals such as truthfulness. Criminal de-
fense lawyers may work with the artificial notion of "legal truth,"
but, in general, lawyers in both litigation and advising contexts
must respect constraints on the presentation of arguments and ev-
idence. These constraints are designed to ensure that a legal judg-
ment, whether that of an adjudicator or a lawyer in an advisory
capacity, is more than "fake news." The virtues of truthfulness,
which Williams labels Accuracy and Sincerity, are compelling ethi-
cal ideals in connection with the goal of preventing the government
from abusing its power, but their effectiveness demands that they
be expressed in a set of institutions and practices that are dedicated
to the virtues of truthfulness. 12 1 Arbitrary power can be checked by
insisting that official action be based on true information about the
world, and that powerful actors not act in secret or obfuscate their
intentions, but reveal the true motivations for their conduct. Of
course, truthfulness may be necessary, but it is certainly not suffi-
cient for justice. A powerful majority may oppress a minority and
118. See Jeremy Waldron, The Rule of Law and the Importance of Procedure, in GETTING
TO THE RULE OF LAW 3, 15 (James E. Fleming ed., 2011).
119. WILLIAMS, Saint-Just's, supra note 72, at 139.
120. E. P. THOMPSON, WHIGS AND HUNTERS: THE ORIGIN OF THE BLACK ACT 260-66 (1975).
121. WILLIAMS, TRUTH, supra note 27, at 207-08.
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be perfectly truthful about its reasons for doing so, as was the case
with the apartheid government in South Africa. In many cases,
however, fidelity to other values such as equality and human dig-
nity can be enhanced by public institutions that are designed to re-
quire reasoned arguments, evidentiary support, and challenges to
the veracity of another party's position. The American tendency to
conduct policymaking and policy implementation through lawyer-
dominated litigation has been noted and criticized by political sci-
entists. 122 Litigation can be protracted, costly, and unpleasant. But
in these times of apparent indifference to truth, the legal profession
with its characteristic ethical standards may turn out to offer hope
for the maintenance of democratic standards of accountability and
limits on the power of the government. For all the criticism often
directed at lawyers, they can at least respond with this brief for a
contribution to an ethical form of life.
122. See ROBERT A. KAGAN, ADVERSARIAL LEGALISM: THE AMERICAN WAY OF LAW 9
(2001).
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